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PANEL DISCUSSION
This Panel Discussion took place as a part of the Second Annual
Corporate Symposium, Beyond Collective Bargaining and Employ-
ment at Will: Discharging Employees in the 1990s, at the University
of Cincinnati College of Law, Cincinnati, Ohio, on March 9, 1989.
PANEL MEMBERS:
John J. Murphy, Moderator, Professor of Law
University of Cincinnati College of Law
Marc S. Krass, Senior Counsel,
The Procter & Gamble Company, Cincinnati, Ohio
Paul Tobias,
Chairman, Plaintiffs Employment Lawyers Association,
Tobias & Kraus, Cincinnati, Ohio
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Assistant Professor of Law and Economics
University of Cincinnati College of Law
William B. Gould, IV
Charles A. Beardsley Professor of Law, Stanford Law School
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.
Professor of Law, Villanova Law School
Daniel Kosanovich,
Attorney at Law, Logothetis & Pence
Dayton, Ohio
Tom Manley
Attorney at Law, Hutton & Williams
Winston-Salem, North Carolina
Dennis Henry
President, Local 175, Utility Workers' Union of America
Dayton, Ohio
DISCUSSION
PROF. MURPHY: I am John Murphy, Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Cincinnati College of Law. This is the concluding session of
the program, the Panel Discussion, and the purpose is to solicit
questions and comments.
We have a large team on this panel; Bill Gould, Hank Perritt, Dan
Kosanovich, Tom Manley. I am going to add Dennis Henry, who
spoke this morning on the Dayton Power & Light [DP & L] experi-
ence. Since we have already heard from them, I am going to pro-
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pose that we ask for comments by the members- of this panel whom
we haven't heard from before. That is Marc Krass from Procter &
Gamble, Paul Tobias, a local attorney with a national reputation in
employee rights, and Ken Dau-Schmidt, a colleague of mine.
We will turn now to our first commentator, Marc Krass from
Procter & Gamble. He is an employment lawyer with Procter &
Gamble and manages labor relations throughout North America
and Canada. This includes operations with independent unions, af-
filiated unions, and operations without a union at all. Marc Krass.
MR. KRASS: It seems pretty clear, listening to all the presentations
we have had so far, that there have been a lot of changes in how, in
the United States, employees are employed. It seems equally clear
that the law will have to catch up with these changes. All of us,
whether we are practicing or whether we are studying law, are trying
to predict where the law will be in two years, since the actions we
take today will be measured by that law and it will be much different.
Hence, it makes no sense for your client to proceed without ob-
taining your perspective as to the direction of the law at that point.
This is a very difficult challenge, I think, for all of us.
The question that Professor Gould raised when talking about the
Supreme Court's Yeshiva' case, is whether, in advanced work sys-
tems with a high degree of worker participation in determining the
direction of the enterprise, an employee is acting in a managerial
capacity. If the employer is acting as a manager, collective bargain-
ing is inappropriate for that organization.
Many employers are moving toward systems where their non-
managers are effectively managing the daily business of the opera-
tion, whether in blue-collar situations such as manufacturing, or in
more white-collar situations like the university in Yeshiva. 2 Where
there is such an alignment of economic interest between manage-
ment and labor, the law questions whether the distinctions between
the two entities are so blurred that there really may be no sense in
having collective bargaining.
I just want to question whether perhaps there still are roles for
unions and collective bargaining, even in those advanced work sys-
tems. One key role, a traditional role for the unions, is that of the
advocate, dealing with questions of discharge, discipline, unfairness
by senior management and failures of the system. Defining that ad-
vanced work system in the workplace is another traditional role the
union could still perform in these settings.
I. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
2. Id.
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There is also an opportunity for unions to exercise their leader-
ship and training. The unions, using their position and centralized
resources, could exert a great deal of influence as the work system
changes. They could serve as a guardian of the non-manager inter-
ests. While this could. occur without the formal institution of a
union, they are ideally positioned to participate.
Dan Kosanovich raised an interesting point about how grievances
and disputes can be resolved more effectively. One of the problems
I frequently find in a- grievance situation is that the parties immedi-
ately start posturing for the ultimate legal battle in arbitration,
rather than use the grievance procedure as an effective problem-
solving opportunity. They immediately start posturing, are very
careful about their choice of words, and as Dan pointed out, they
often ignore or don't even try to find out what the real issue is.
I think it is important for lawyers to urge clients to use the griev-
ance procedure for problem-solving. That is difficult if you have a
traditional contract with a traditional grievance procedure and know
you may well end up in a battle before an arbitrator anyway. To
resolve that problem you must meet the letter of the procedure laid
out in the contract, but also go beyond the contract and see what
else you can do to try to find out what is the issue, what is motivating
the parties to go forward, what will solve the real problem, not just
what will adjust the legal issue. All too often the parties come
before an arbitrator, one party wins and the other party loses, and
the problem is still there when the arbitration is over. Therefore, it
is important to continue the discussions, whether in a formal griev-
ance meeting or in the hallway afterwards, until the real issue is
discovered.
Some employers have extended the' last stage in the contractual
grievance procedure prior to arbitration. For example, the third
step, where the plant manager and the union president or business
agent are meeting to have the last go-around on the grievance, the
plant manager says, "I am denying the grievance for this reason."
As the lawyer, I am not going to assume the next step is arbitration,
even though that is the next step according to the terms of the con-
tract. I have seen a "third-and-a-half-step meeting"-I have had
one client go to "three and three-quarters"-just in terms of contin-
uing the dialogue, probing back to find out what is the real issue,
making sure each side is hearing one another and trying to get the
ultimate problem resolved.
I also endorse the DP & L theory that the grievant, the party af-
fected, remain in the process all the way through. This is critical,
not only so the grievant can meet with all parties at all stages in the
1989]
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procedure and participate in the process, but also so the people who
make the ultimate decision can hear the person who is most affected
all the way through as well. This mutual communication is very
important.
Tom Manley discussed greater employee involvement in the
workplace. The model changes away from Dan Kosanovich's old
model where the employees were the doers who operated from the
neck down and management were the thinkers who operated from
the neck up. As management realizes that employees have great
value from the neck up as well as from the neck down, it will put an
entire resource to work to move the business forward. This realiza-
tion has already started.
Although the employee role is being redefined, so that employees
have more information and more opportunities to decide how the
work should be done, what standards must be met, how to reduce
costs in scrap and waste, and so forth, the new role for management
is still uncertain. Employees are doing more and more of what first-
level and sometimes second-level managers traditionally used to do
with a resulting elimination of many of those managers. A self-man-
aging workforce does not need a large group of managers. Some
managers will be retained, but their roles will be different. They will
coach, guide and serve as resources for the teams of employees
working on the problems and managing the business daily.
It can cause a great deal of stress in those managers who are told
by their top management, "Move this work system in the new direc-
tion. Give the employees more power, encourage them, train them
to run the business daily," but at the same time are not told what
their new role and responsibilities will be. These managers may be-
gin to question their validity in the system of tomorrow. As a result
they may resist the changes that top management and employees
want to see. This may ultimately result in litigation for wrongful
discharge, which you all will have to deal with later.
Finally, in response to Professor Perritt and his suggestions about
wrongful-dismissal legislation, I think that there is some experience
with legislation of this type in Canada, particularly the western prov-
inces, which have had wrongful discharge statutes for some time.
Those statutes generally provide for damages where wrongful dis-
charge is proved, but not reinstatement. That system wouldn't nec-
essarily work in the United States, but there is a bank of data in
Canada that we can investigate if the United States considers mov-
ing in this direction.
One thing that is apparent, though, for any employer, whether
operating in one jurisdiction or across the country is that the law of
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wrongful discharge is constantly changing. Consequently, as I said
in the beginning, there is difficulty trying to predict the standards
that will be used to judge your client's behavior one or two or five
years hence when that case finally gets to court.
Nobody knows what the Montana Supreme Court is going to do
with the current case, 3 nor does anybody know what the Ohio
Supreme Court is going to do in cases that it has. That is true, of
course, for the federal judiciary as well, which I think ultimately will
resolve these issues.
From the employer's perspective, I would acknowledge that there
is always a line over which the employer cannot cross when dealing
with its employees. The only question is, "Where is that line going
to be drawn?" From an employer's standpoint, operating within the
constantly evolving court-made and legislative-made legal base, it is
really up to the employer always to be fair, to obtain all the informa-
tion needed to make an objective decision and to be even-handed in
all decisions. If the employer does that, it is going to be able to
meet the standards of any court-made doctrine or any state legisla-
tive doctrine in the employment law area. That would be my best
guidance to employers, given the constantly changing state of the
law.
PROF. MURPHY: Thank you, Marc. He mentioned the fact that the
parties, in their process of traditionally resolving problems or the
prospect of arbitration keep one eye on the possibility of a fair-rep-
resentation case. Our next commentator is probably one familiar
with the law in that area. Paul Tobias is a local attorney with a na-
tional reputation, an author of several recently published volumes
on the subject of employment at will and collective bargaining. He
is also Chairman of the Plaintiffs Employment Lawyers group. Paul
Tobias.
MR. TOBIAS: Thank you. It is great to be back at the University of
Cincinnati Law School.
I was in Florida yesterday for a meeting of the Executive Board of
Plaintiffs Employment Lawyers Association. They took a resound-
ing "no" vote with respect to all this take-a-away legislation being
proposed. That's the view of the plaintiffs' bar. The law of em-
ployee rights throughout the country is now catching up to where it
should be. As a result, employers are trying to persuade legislators
3. On June 29, 1989, the Montana Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-
901 to 914 (1987). Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 1989 Mont. Lexis 162
(1989).
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to take away rights and give nothing in exchange. The plaintiffs'
bar, is against it, except in Georgia, New York State and a few other
states.
I am not going to talk about the topic: "What is Good for Em-
ployers." I think who ever wrote this brochure made a spelling er-
ror. The topic should be: Where does the employees' self-interest
lie? We should also be questioning: Where does the public interest
lie? Those are the issues we want to talk about: what is good for
America and what is good for employees?
A friend of mine is the president of a great corporation in this
country. He told me, "If I treat my employees fairly, the stock of my
company goes up." I asked, "What happens to your profits if you
have to keep inefficient employees?" He answered, "No problem, it
is good for business to be fair, to have a happy work force and to
have good morale." It is good for America to help dismissed em-
ployees. There are several million broken spirits who have been
fired by employers. They are without income and without the resili-
ence to get back on their feet. They need programs and the income
necessary for rehabilitation.
It is also good for America and good for employers to remedy and
stop outrageous conduct in the workplace. Believe me, my office is
like the emergency ward at General Hospital. Day after day I see
horrible cases of cruel treatment. I would hate to work in any of
America's working establishments if it is like what I hear in my of-
fice. Fortunately, it's only one percent of the work force that is mis-
treated. But that is still a lot of injustice.
Now what about the 1990s? What lies ahead of us? In my opin-
ion the current trend of erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine
will continue. There is more media coverage and public awareness
of the rights of non-union employees. The telephones are ringing
in the offices of employment law specialists because people that get
fired are told by their friends and family to see a lawyer. The trend
is sensitivity to injustice in the workplace and the increased use of
lawyers. In the 1990s lawyers will be still raising hell with the em-
ployers who treat workers badly. Regardless of what the law is, law-
yers will be busy helping dismissed employees and litigating
employee rights issues.
"Jury" is a "four-letter word" for employers. Juries frequently is-
sue large punitive damages awards. That is why employers want
legislation to take dismissal cases away from the jury.
Why are large punitive damages awards important? If the media
reports that some employee in Oshkosh got $10 million dollars,
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boy, that sounds awful. Some may say, "Gee, why should that plain-
tiff get so much money? Why should his lawyer get a third of it as a
fee?" Employers say, "We ought to pass a law to prevent such
windfalls."
Ladies and gentlemen, fear of punitive damages is what makes
large companies obey the law. The large corporations are fright-
ened of punitive damages and this fear acts as a deterrent to wrong-
ful discharge. Large employers are telling their staffs, "Be nice. Be
good. Be fair. Use progressive discipline. Don't fire people without
just cause. Firing is the last resort." I have been at scores of semi-
nars throughout the country in the last five years. Distinguished
speakers and professors are telling house counsel and personnel di-
rectors, "Be fair to employees. Avoid arbitrary and unjust
terminations."
Why are they telling these people in these seminars to do the
right thing? Is it because of ethical or religious considerations?
Possibly. But they are also telling them because they are scared to
death of juries and punitive damages. Please remember that if new
statutes take away punitive damages, employers will feel free, once
more, to fire "at will."
What is the position of the plaintiffs' bar? We are constructive. I
personally believe in a small-claims court concept. We should have
optional small-claims type tribunals for employees who want a
speedy, cheap, informal hearing by an arbitrator. This should in-
clude the possibility of reinstatement, modest damages, and some
attorney fees. However, if the employee elected to go to arbitration
he would risk res judicata consequences. If the arbitrator held the
employee was treated fairly, and there was just cause for dismissal,
then in any other future proceedings, either before EEOC, federal
or state court, the adverse finding possibly could be held against
him. The employee takes some risk in going to arbitration. How-
ever, an employee should not be required to give up his common
law claims. The remedy of arbitration should be optional, not
mandatory. But I venture that millions of Americans would choose
an optional non-preempting remedy, a small-claims type cheap,
speedy arbitration tribunal. That's what we in the plaintiffs' bar sug-
gest. Other solutions would be additional restraints and limitations
on employees. Thank you.
PROF. MURPHY: Thank you, Paul. Ken Dau-Schmidt, our next com-
mentator, is my colleague. He has a Ph.D. in economics, and has
practiced in labor relations. It is a pleasure to introduce him.
1989] 437
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PROF. DAU-SCHMIDT: Mr. Tobias is a tough act to follow. I am sure
people have comments and questions, so I will try not to delay for
too long your entry into this debate.
Professor Murphy asked me to try to draw together the various
presentations we've enjoyed today. At first this may appear a Her-
culean task. There is a real dichotomy between our first topic of
cooperative labor relations and our second topic of wrongful dismis-
sal statutes. But it is not just by chance that these two topics were
chosen for this symposium. I believe that these topics, and the di-
chotomy between them, accurately reflect the current state of Amer-
ican labor and employment law.
The impetus behind our labor and employment laws is the failure
of individual bargaining to meet the desires and needs of employ-
ees. Individual bargaining fails to meet these needs and desires for
a variety of reasons.
One reason is that individual employees can't efficiently bargain
for public goods that they consume in the workplace. Such goods
include health and safety measures, medical insurance, and other
common working conditions. These goods are shared or jointly
consumed and workers who value them highly cannot exclude the
consumption of these goods by other workers who "freeride" and
don't negotiate for these goods. Thus, individual bargaining results
in an inefficiently low amount of such goods in the workplace.
Another reason is that individuals cannot always adequately eval-
uate the terms they should seek in bargaining. Individuals don't
have the information they need for bargaining and cannot accu-
rately evaluate risks, such as the risk of being injured or the risk of
being discharged without cause, that must be evaluated for intelli-
gent bargaining. As a result, there are serious impediments to indi-
vidual bargaining over sophisticated contract terms, especially those
involving risk.
And, finally, individuals can't get the contract terms they want
from employers because, individually, they don't have sufficient bar-
gaining power. As a result, they look elsewhere for redress with
their employers.
Now, traditionally there have been two ways to remedy the fail-
ures of individual bargaining. One is collective bargaining; the
other one is legislation, the two topics we discuss today. For a time,
from the 1930s to the early 1960s, collective bargaining was the pre-
dominant means this country used to redress the failures of individ-
ual bargaining and resolve disputes in employee-employer relations.
However, since that time, unions have suffered a precipitous decline
438 [Vol. 58
PANEL DISCUSSION
in the private sector in this country. I believe that this decline has
largely been due to employer recalcitrance and failure of the laws to
adequately punish such recalcitrance. Whatever the reason, this de-
cline in union power has decreased the importance of collective bar-
gaining in solving the problems of individual employees. With this
decline in unions and collective bargaining, the country has moved
more and more towards uniform legislation to solve the problems of
employees. We see this in the new plant closing legislation, the pro-
posals on childcare and health care legislation, and the proposals
for wrongful dismissal statutes.
As a result, in the 1980s we have a residual core of employees and
employers who have collective bargaining relationships, some ma-
ture enough to realize the benefits of cooperation and power shar-
ing, and we have the remainder of employees who must rely on
legislation to solve their problems in the labor market. As a result,
it is not surprising that both cooperative collective bargaining and
wrongful dismissal statutes are important issues in American labor
and employment law in the late 1980s.
Now, for particular comments on the presentations. With respect
to Professor Gould and cooperative labor relations, I think Profes-
sor Gould has quite accurately described the problem. Parties, such
as Dayton Power and Light and Local 175, who engage in coopera-
tive bargaining and power sharing, have developed a relationship
that was not envisioned in our labor laws. As Professor Gould
points out, Section 8(a)(2), Section 8(a)(5) and the definition of em-
ployees in the National Labor Relations Act 4 do not envision this
new kind of relationship and stand as potential impediments to its
development.
I believe that, as long as the union's independent status is not
undermined, cooperative bargaining and power sharing is a good
thing. Indeed, it is the best of all collective bargaining relationships.
As we heard today from Dayton Power and Light and Local 175,
cooperative bargaining consists of employees and employers sitting
down, communicating their differences, exchanging information
and trying to resolve their problems together. That is the best of
collective bargaining. Thus, I think that such relationships should
be encouraged and fostered in the law, and as Professor Gould ar-
gues, we should try to either interpret or amend the law so it does
not inhibit this kind of activity.
I worry, though, about the chasm between those employees and
employers who have such mature collective bargaining relationships
4. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1982).
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and the rest of the employees out there who either are not repre-
sented by an independent union or perhaps have a recalcitrant em-
ployer. For most employees, there is no way that cooperative
collective bargaining can address their problems in the workplace. I
worry about the practical limitation of increasing cooperation. I be-
lieve it should be encouraged, but I worry that it's not going to
reach the vast majority of employees.
With respect to Professor Perritt and wrongful discharge legisla-
tion, I agree with him that we should enact legislation limiting the
employment-at-will doctrine, although I have somewhat different
reasons.
As I understand his presentation-and his article is quite clear, it
is not hard to understand, it is a very good presentation-he makes
no normative prescription as to whether the demise of the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine is good or bad. He argues instead that this
demise is inevitable and that it's in employers' best interest to get
involved in drafting and enacting wrongful dismissal statutes to en-
sure that their concerns are addressed and to promote integration
of any such a solution into the overall legal structure. He wants to
prevent adding yet another layer of claims and another forum to the
legal doctrine.
I would make a positive statement that I applaud the demise of
the employment-at-will doctrine. And, I agree with Professor Perritt
that legislation is the best means to accomplish this change in our
employment law. Given the demise of collective bargaining in this
country, legislation is probably the most efficient means of dealing
with employees' rights in discharge. I would add that I think it's
appropriate, under our constitutional system, for our elected legis-
lature to make such a decision which fundamentally changes our
public policy and employment laws.
My support of wrongful dismissal legislation might surprise some
people because I have an economics background. Traditionally
economists resist mandatory contract terms and a wrongful dismis-
sal statute imposes such a mandatory contract term. A wrongful dis-
missal statute would prohibit employment-at-will relationships and
impose on every employment agreement some minimum level of
job security for employees.
Traditionally, economists say that imposing mandatory contract
terms is inefficient in that the benefits of the term must not out-
weigh its costs. The argument is that if the benefits of the term out-'
weighed its costs, the parties would voluntarily adopt the term in
their agreement. If the government must impose a contract term,
the benefits must not exceed its costs and the term is inefficient.
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In response to this argument, I think there are some valid argu-
ments that, in fact, just cause or some level of employment security
in excess of employment-at-will is efficient for most employees.
First, you can go back to the argument I previously raised that indi-
viduals can't adequately evaluate their risk of being discharged, and
thus don't bargain for employment security in individual bargaining
even though it is efficient. Second, there is the empirical evidence
that employment security and just cause protection is negotiated
into most collective bargaining agreements. Evidently the employ-
ees and employers who enter into these collective agreements be-
lieve that the benefits of employment security outweigh its costs and
thus is efficient.
However, putting efficiency aside, I think the real driving force
behind wrongful dismissal legislation is the values of the American
people. The law is not just about economic efficiency. It's an order-
ing of the conflicting desires of people. I think that most Ameri-
cans, myself included, do not value an employer's desire to
arbitrarily or perhaps maliciously discharge employees. As a result,
we don't want to give merit to that desire in our law and will provide
employees with some protection against arbitrary or malicious
discharge.
Moreover, to the extent that wrongful dismissal legislation injects
inefficiency into the economy, that inefficiency will be dispropor-
tionately borne by employers who are irresponsible in their dealings
with employees and discharge employees without cause. This ad-
ded burden will tend to drive these irresponsible employers out of
the economy. I say good riddance to them. I hope they are re-
placed by better employers. I think they will be.
Finally, if I could return to my initial point about the trade-off
between collective bargaining and legislation in remedying employ-
ees' problems in the workplace. One reason why I favor legislation
limiting the employment-at-will doctrine is the decline of collective
bargaining in this country. The benefits of just-cause protection
under collective bargaining agreements are limited to relatively few
employees. Realistically, the only way the majority of employees are
going to gain the benefit of any form of job security is through uni-
form legislation.
But I see such legislation as an inferior solution to collective bar-
gaining in this case, and I regret having to take it. Collective bar-
gaining is often a better solution to employee's problems than
uniform legislation, and the case of employee job security is a prime
example.
19891
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As Professor Perritt points out in his article, collective bargaining
with a just cause clause and mutual resolution of grievances by the
parties is a superior solution to uniform legislation in addressing
discharge grievances, because the parties can reach an individual so-
lution that fits their needs that can never be achieved through a uni-
form statute. The parties are the ones that have to live with their
agreement, they are the ones that know what is best for them, and
they should be the ones to decide how discharge grievances are
resolved.
Also, the resolution of discharge grievances under collective bar-
gaining, using arbitration, is a much more efficient method of deal-
ing with these problems than under a wrongful dismissal statute
using litigation. Professor Perritt advocates incorporating arbitra-
tion procedures into wrongful dismissal statutes, and I agree with
him on this point. But, there are possible constitutional problems
with this solution. It is not clear that the government can compel
the use of such procedures without violating the Seventh Amend-
ment. 5 So, on the one hand, we have collective bargaining, with the
more efficient system of grievance arbitration, and on the other, if
we use legislation and the constitutional questions are resolved the
wrong way, we may end up with a very burdensome system of litigat-
ing discharge grievances.
Finally, as Professor Perritt has pointed out, with legislation we
often simply add another layer of legal doctrine and another forum
on top of existing remedies. Although Professor Perritt would like
to avoid this problem with wrongful dismissal legislation by inte-
grating it into existing remedies, I worry that the legislatures will
take the politically expedient route and merely add another solution
without integration. Professor Perritt has already addressed the
problems such layering of doctrine and forums can cause.
In conclusion, while I applaud the recent efforts at cooperative
labor relations, I bemoan the recent decline of collective bargaining
in our country. A decline which I believe has resulted due to our
failure to properly encourage and foster collective bargaining. In
response to this decline I believe there is a need for more protective
legislation including wrongful dismissal legislation. Thank you.
PROF. MURPHY: Thank you, Ken.
We have the Tobias proposal of a small-claims court on discipli-
nary discharge, optional but precluding employees from other
forms that they choose to employ.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved . . .").
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We have the Perritt proposal of a disciplinary dismissal statute,
and we have the question implied by the Gould presentation and by
the Kosanovich and Manley presentation, that is: How are discipli-
nary dismissal and other forms of discipline going to be handled in
the experiments where employee groups and management share
power? These presentations set the context for that question,
although it wasn't directly raised.
So now is the time for you to make comments or raise questions.
You can direct them to anyone who made a presentation at an ear-
lier part of the program. Does anybody have any question or com-
ments? Yes, sir, could you please give us your name?
MR. HOGAN: My name is Charles Hogan. I was associated with an
employer for many years. The question is for Mr. Tobias. Is it still
the case law in Ohio that malicious discharge of an employee is not
actionable?
MR. TOBIAS: I would never concede that generality, because there
are certain torts that still exist and are being used creatively by the
plaintiffs' bar, such as defamation, the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, fraud, false imprisonment, interference with contrac-
tual relationships and the right to privacy. So if you can find the
right tort to apply to the particular discharge situation, you can get
relief for "malicious" activity on the part of the employer. However,
if you are merely pleading, "He fired me maliciously, please give me
damages," you would probably get tossed out of court, because at
the moment there is no such cause of action for bad faith malicious
discharge in Ohio..
There is still a question about the tort of discharge in violation of
public policy. The Supreme Court of Ohio in the Phung6 case has
said, there may be no cause of action for a dismissal in violation of
public policy. Ohio is one of the few backward states in that area of
law. However, recently the Supreme Court has agreed to reconsider
the issue and hopefully Phung will be modified. 7
MR. LANDEN: My name is Everett Landen. I just want to ask Profes-
sor Gould about the action of the California Supreme Court in the
Foley8 decision of December 29th. The ABA columns said it was a
great reversal. I read the case with some interest and saw it backing
away from a full intentional tort claim for the breach of the duty of
fair dealing, but saw them sort of saying that they retained the con-
6. Phung v. Waste Management, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 3d 100, 491 N.E.2d 1114 (1986).
7. Greely v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 40 Ohio St. 3d 706, 534
N.E.2d 847 (1988).
8. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373 (1988).
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tract right for breach of the fair dealing. I wonder if that's the way
you read it and understood it or what comments you have on it.
PROF. GOULD: No. Let me say that, of course, Foley did, in contrast
to the holdings of a number of the intermediate courts in California
and of the United States Court of Appeals, back away from the idea
of punitive damages and tort damages for the violation of covenants
of good faith and the fair dealing obligation.
There are three principal areas that Foley confronts. One is that it
holds for the first time that the implied contract is a theory which
will be recognized in California. That is to say, that you can form a
contractual relationship even where there is not something explicit
or fancy like the contracts of Reggie Jackson or Dan Rather. I think
that is a very significant aspect of Foley, because in a fairly abbrevi-
ated period of time, on the basis of the way in which the employer
and employee deal with one another, this kind of obligation may
arise. As Professor Perritt says, we don't have any knowledge of
what the remedy is going to be in California. It could be a very
expensive remedy, and it could cover a very large number of years.
Secondly, the court continued to adhere to its 1980 ruling in the
Tameny 9 case. California recognizes, as many other jurisdictions do,
that the public policy exception to the principle that the contract of
employment is terminable at will is going along very well. However,
the court defined it fairly narrowly in this particular case. Only Jus-
tice Mosk disagreed with the majority of the court in its conclusion
that, while it is against public policy for the employer to retaliate
against the employee when it goes to the public authorities to whis-
tle-blow, it is not against public policy to dismiss a worker when he
or she complains to his own employer about wrongdoing that he
observes.. This is an anomaly, that as a matter of policy someone
can go outside but not inside.
Lastly, the Court does not address the host of independent tort
causes of action referred to by Paul Tobias. What impact the
Court's holding has on these tort causes of action is difficult to say.
Could I just say a word about what I would like to see?
PROF. MURPHY: Go right ahead, Professor Gould.
PROF. GOULD: I think that the Foley 10 opinion's holding on contracts
really comports with the employment relationship as it is. That is to
say, most employees in the employment relationship have the ex-
pectation that they will be treated fairly, that they will not be dis-
9. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980).
10. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373 (1988).
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missed without cause. That's very important. It will be the starting
point for consideration of all policy. The seeds for this policy are in
the anti-discrimination laws. The modern manifestation of that is
the reverse discrimination cases, which, as pernicious as those cases
have been for our societal fabric, have really manifested the desire
by employees, all employees, to be treated fairly. The employees
have said, "Hey, look, standards of fairness have been created in
other areas of arbitrary conduct. Other people have been pro-
tected, why can't I be protected also?" That is very important.
Minority employees and female employees often have focused
upon elements of fairness when they can't show racial or sexual dis-
crimination as employers have modified personnel practices in re-
sponse to such changes. It's an important, good change for us,
triggered by the civil rights revolution.
The second point I'd like to make is that virtually no employers
voluntarily adopt the mechanisms for dismissals that we see in the
organized sector of the economy. You would think, if the market
was operating, that some employers would say, "Well, we may have
to pay my workers a little bit less if I would give them something
more of that which is valuable: job security in exchange for pay
raises." Maybe that other guy wants to pay big wages but doesn't
want to provide any kind of security. Although, out of the threat of
wrongful discharge actions, employers have moved to accept ad hoc
arbitration where they control and pay for it, they will not accept in
the main arbitration for nonunion employees which resembles any-
thing like what we have now in collective agreements.
I advocate, in the California State Committee report, referred to
earlier, basically three things. One is a just-cause system. It seems
to me that that is what the courts are accepting in many jurisdictions
through implied contracts, and whatever the courts do, that is what
juries are accepting, regardless of the legal instructions that are
given them.
Secondly, we are simply in a situation where the average em-
ployee is screened out of the existing system because many of these
theories are not particularly relevant to the average employee.
Thirdly, the report supports limited traditional labor law reme-
dies; back pay with interest, attorney's fees, cost for the prevailing
employee, reinstatement where appropriate, or where not appropri-
ate lost wages for up to two years' subsequent to the time of rein-
statement if it would have been reinstated. In the case of employees
who are particularly vulnerable and unlikely to obtain alternate em-
ployment, more may be available.
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Where this proposal, which was put forward five years ago, differs
from the existing system, is that it is designed, even though it limits
the remedies, to benefit the average employee, the mass of employ-
ees, and not the relatively privileged few who are able to work their
way through the existing system and retain excellent counsel like
Paul Tobias.
PROF. MURPHY: Sir, would you state your name into the record?
MR. O'CONNOR: My name is John O'Connor. I am a student here at
the University of Cincinnati. I have a. question for Professor Gould.
During your presentation you mentioned a specific provision in
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act" which, I
believe, defines an employee of a company that is furnished by an-
other company as the employee of the purchasing company for the
purpose of identification in the Act. You found that to be an impor-
tant provision. I would like you to expand on that more specifically.
Do you see that as an important provision of the statute for the area
of purchase/acquisitions now, or is it something you see expanding
on employee rights in other areas of labor law?
PROF. GOULD: Well, on the latter point, one question which Con-
gress did not focus upon explicitly at any point during the 1988 de-
bate on the plant closing legislation, ironically, given the awareness
of the National Labor Relations Act, was the question of to what
extent the Board, in formulating its own views of what constitutes an
unfair labor practice violation, must take into account the 1988 law.
This question has already arisen in many different forms under
the National Labor Relations Act in connection with other statutes
that have previously been enacted by Congress, such as, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Landrum-Griffin Act' of 1959.
We have a variety of answers, depending upon the form in which the
question arises.
So question number one is, is the Board agreeing to impose obli-
gations upon a successor employer where the employer did not give
notice and did not give the kind of alternate opportunities that an
employer must provide or offer in order to escape imposition of em-
ployee status upon the successor?
I have long thought that-again, this goes to the question of uni-
form law-that the Board ought to take into account the will of Con-
gress where explicitly provided for in different statutes and in the
1988 statute, where it interprets the 1935 statute.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988).
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Now, in regard to your first question on mergers, I don't have the
statute in-front of me, but my recollection is that the statute speaks
of purchases and sales explicitly, and I think that each business rear-
rangement would have to be examined to see whether or not it
could fit within that ruling.
PROF. MURPHY: Sir?
MR. MORLEY: My name is Michael Morley. I am a student here. I
would like to direct a question at Mr. Henry. I remember seeing a
couple of weeks ago something on dissident union members who
oppose cooperative employee/management relations in the auto in-
dustry. There was the perception that the union was selling out to
management, and I was wondering how much of that did you en-
counter in the creation of the labor compact at DP & L?
MR. HENRY: When you deal with a group as big as 1800 people, you
will always have different opinions. We communicated what we
were attempting to do throughout the negotiation process. This
communication had a great deal to do with the ratification of the 3-
to-I vote in favor of that type of compact. You always will have peo-
ple who have different opinions and some may be accused of being
"in bed" with the company, so to speak. But when you get right
down to the bottom line, if the company doesn't exist, we don't exist
on a local-type level.
So what you have to do is work real hard to make sure that the
people who have concerns have them addressed. In our case we did
it through the creation of a resolution process so that the people
who have those concerns have their say and we have the ability to do
the problem solving. Even though some people may accuse you of
selling out to the company, you can really see where the differences
are resolved.
That is how we dealt with the problem. It is not a big problem,
and, again, these things are new to employees and employers. It is
breaking a 40-year tradition, so to speak, and it takes a lot of work to
make it work.
Interestingly enough, the group really bought into it at first. They
did have the concept that, "This is the way we can fix all our
problems and this is something new, and we are all going to jump
on the band wagon and go with it." Then as you go along, some-
thing happens and then they start to revert. That is the tough part,
keeping them from going back to the adversarial position. But
those are the things that we have to work at.
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PROF. MURPHY: Are there any other questions or comments? I think
Professor Perritt wanted to make a comment. Professor Perritt?
PROF. PERRrrr: I really enjoyed the first two presentations this
morning, but I had an observation that I wanted to make about the
two of them. It grows out of a report that I did for the United States
Department of Labor on the effect of the Railway Labor Act on la-
bor/management cooperation in the railroad and airline industries.
My conclusion in the report is the same one that I would offer more
generally to the National Labor Relations Act.
I am skeptical whether it makes any difference what the law is. I
think that what determines if you are going to have a la-
bor/management cooperative effort like the one described to you by
Mr. Henry, Mr. Manley and Mr. Kosanovich is whether the attitude
is there on the part of the management and on the part of the union.
It would be a mistake to think about the issue from the wrong way,
and suppose that you can't have labor/management cooperation
unless you change the law. I am very skeptical about that.
To take some of the points that Professor Gould raised-and it's
not that I disagree with what I think was a very good and clear pres-
entation on his part about some of the difficult legal areas-what I
quarrel with is whether they really inhibit labor/management
cooperation.
Take, for example, mandatory subjects for bargaining. That
doesn't inhibit labor/management cooperation, because if the em-
ployer wants to bargain, even though over a non-mandatory subject,
it is free to do so. Calls for information won't inhibit la-
bor/management cooperation. If the employer wants to give the in-
formation, it is perfectly free to do that under existing law.
Likewise, with respect to the "employee" definition, at least in
part, if the employees, or those not statutory employees, want to
play a particular role in a cooperative arrangement, that can be
done.
Now, I will say that actions in violation of 8(a)(2)12 , which forbids
dominating and assisting a labor organization, obviously can inhibit
a cooperative effort. But I would be interested to know how many
charges have been filed and how many complaints have issued and
what the remedies have been for 8(a)(2) violations in connection
with bona fide labor/management cooperative arrangements. Our
conclusion with respect to the Railway Labor Act, which has a simi-
lar kind of company/union provision, is that it really probably didn't
12. 29 U.S.C § 158 (1982).
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matter. People could go ahead and take the risk. In the end, if it
was a bona fide arrangement, the likelihood of any kind of remedy
that would trouble anybody very much was pretty small.
So, if the will is there on both sides and if the creativity is there, it
doesn't much matter what the legal environment is. And I would
certainly welcome your reactions to that.
PROF. GOULD: I suppose that my view is that the law has an impact
in two different respects. Of course there would be an 8(a)(2) area
where you could actually say it is a deterrent. I don't know, but
there actually have been a number of articles written about the fre-
quency of 8(a)(2) litigation and the kinds of arrangements that have
been viewed as unlawful in the statute. As to whether those rela-
tionships were arms-length, genuine relationships or not, I don't
know and I don't suppose that anybody knows. On a broader basis,
my point is that if everybody had good relationships, we wouldn't
need the law at all. Maybe that is the ideal, a situation where we
don't need the law at all.
There are certain characteristics of a relationship which tend to
produce a more genuine, wide open, honest and thus ultimately co-
operative relationship which the law can foster. They can be fos-
tered in that kind of relationship by obliging the parties to disclose
and to bargain. The assumption behind the law is that if you can
produce bargaining in particular areas, you may be able to produce
better understanding.
Now, of course, that does not always prove to be the case. In Eu-
rope, where periodic disclosure is required, periodic information-
sharing occurs without anykind of request for information in a bar-
gaining context. It might be said that European unions and employ-
ers who are members of OECD, or members of the European
Economic Community, would have behaved that way anyway. I tend
to think not, though. There are some who will be pushed and
shoved along.
PROF. MURPHY: I think we have to come to a close, but one of our
commentators has asked for 30 seconds. This is Paul Tobias.
MR. TOBIAs: We are in the midst of a law revolution. The decade of
1980 to 1990 was the beginning. We are now seeing a period of
reaction and slowing down of the erosion of the at-will doctrine.
The next ten years will make a difference. I urge the law students
and academics to help us come up with some solutions to the
problems. Down the road ten years, twenty years I predict that the
answer is not going to be state by state legislation, but rather a fed-
eral solution in the form of a national law. The professors started it
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all by important law review articles. Maybe academia can bail us out
of the current state of confusion.
